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ABSTRACT 
Presented is a decentralized tatonnement public good allocation 
process that converges to an efficient allocation in a wide class of 
two good neoclassical economies when consumers are permitted to be 
non-competitive utility maximizers. The process is a demand revealing 
mechanism generalized to include an enforcement rule administered by 
the government which defines a response function, making the govern-
ment a dynamically active participant· in the allocation process .  This 
generalization greatly improves upon the basic mechanism which has been 
considered extensively in the literature, and under which the government 
functions as a passive public good procurement agent when the model is 
formulated dynamically, solely processing information received from con-
sumers artd then implementing the implied demands . Inclusion of an en-
forcement rule permits the government to impose an intertemporal con-
sistency requirement on the communications of individual consumers . It 
is shown that ·there is an enforcement rule so that a strategy equilibrium 
is always attained asymptotically and so that the equilibrium allocation 
is efficient ; in equilibrium, there is no waste, no bankruptcy and con-
sumers communicate local truth . 
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1 . INTRODUCTION 
Considerable attention has been focused recently on the possibility of 
designing social choice mechanisms such that an equilibrium under these 
mechanisms will satisfy given social performance criteria. In particular, 
efforts have been direc ted at the design of resource allocation mechanisms 
re lative to which equilibrium allocations are Pareto efficient for a wide 
class of economic environments . 1 A seminal paper in this literature is that
of Groves and Ledyard (1977) in which a specific mechanism�formulated as a 
system of allocation and taxing rules--is proposed that yields Pareto 
efficient equilibrium allocations of resources to the produc tion of public 
good s in a model where consumers are permitted to misrepresent their true 
preferences if they wish . The significance of the Groves-Ledyard contribution 
and the demand revelation literature in general is diminished only by the 
general non-implementability of the mechanisms that have been proposed . The 
major obstac les to the theoretical implementability of the mechanisms are the 
c onsumer bankrupt cy problem and the problem of ensuring that the mechanisms 
will dynamically generate an equilibrium when consumers' utilities do not 
satisfy a stringent separability condition .2 Unless some procedure can be 
demonstrated that cir cumvents these difficulties while maintaining the 
desirable properties of the demand revelation mechanisms, the approach is not 
of practical significance.  The purpose of this paper is to develop a 
procedure that implements a demand revelation mechanism for a wide class of 
neoclassical economic environments . 
Previous investigations of the implementability question have 
c oncentrated on the stability of equilibria for particular economic 
environments relative to mechanisms with the Groves-Ledyard (G-L) allocation 
rule that are administered by a government under alternative dynamic 
behavioral hypotheses .3 Each hypothesized behavior for agents defines a
system of response rules for the agents which, in turn , completely determines 
the economi c system' s adjustment dynamics. If equilibria for the posed 
economic system are stable for a given set of agents ' response rules , then the 
allocation mechanism generates ( i . e .  converges to ) an equilibrium, and , in 
this sense , is implementable p rovided agents behave as assumed . In general , 
the literature has viewed these models as N-player non-cooperative games , and 
no reasonable dynamic behavioral hypothesis bas been shown to yield stable 
strategy equilibria within this basic framework for any general economic 
environment .4 For example , Bamford (1979 ) and Ledyard (1978) both have to
restrict severely the values of various utility parameters for every specific 
economic environment considered to obtain stability or convergence under a 
notion that an enforcement structure is implicit in any specification of a 
demand revelation mechanism , we are able to develop a model in which the 
government ' s  role is not dynamically passive . The government is permitted to 
learn from history ( i . e . previous adjustments ),  and to enforce this history by 
restr icting subsequent ad justments in whatever manner it believes to be 
consistent with the history--a notion that requires definition--while still 
allowing consumers considerable autonomy in their decisions . This learning 
mechanism for government entails a technically slight but conceptually 
significant modification of the demand revelation mechanism . Here, the 
economic system ' s  adjustment dynamics is determined by an evolving enforcement 
structure--the government ' s  response rule--� well as consumers ' response 
rules . 
The ad justments are iterative , the procedure is tatonnement, and the 
model is deterministic.  Thus , the appropriate concept of equilibrium is that 
Cournot behavioral hypothesis . Ledyard found the instability to be due to bad of best replay where consumers communicate successively equivalent strategies 
income effects or overreactions by agents . To obtain convergence under 
alternative behavioral hypotheses , Ledyard (1978 ) has to assume there are no 
income effects . The consumer bankruptcy problem is not addressed . 
The role of the government in these models has always been dynamically 
passive . Once the government has announced the allocation and tax rules and 
the allowable message space, its sole responsibility has been to p rocess the 
information received at each iteration according to these rules , and then to 
transmit the results back to consumers, terminating the p rocess according to 
some stopping rule. 
and the government does not alter the enforcement structure (the set of time­
specific permissible strategies or communications ) .  When viewed statically , 
this equilibrium concept is a straightforward generalization of the Nash 
equilibrium as employed by Groves-Ledyard (1977 ) and others .  The general 
formal structure of the model for two good ( one private , one public) neo­
classical economi es is presented in the next section . 
In section 3, a particular tatonnement allocation process is considered. 
For this process , consumers are required to communicate entire functions that 
satisfy a uniform curvature restriction. For each vector of functions 
In this paper , the general iterative or dynamic game theoretic approach communicated by consumers , the government selects a single point for each 
to the implementation problem is not emphasized; rather , the problem is viewed consumer , using the allocation rule,  and then restricts consumers ' subsequent 
as principally a question of optimal institutional design . By exploiting the 
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communications to the subclass of allowable functions that pass through the 
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individually assigned points, and so on. Thus, the enforcement structure 
evolves gradually by restricting further with each round of communications the 
choice sets for consumers. 
What is important is that the particular nature of the intertemporal 
collapse of each consumer's choice set is determined by the strategic 
interactions of the consumers themselves, given the allocation and tax rules. 
It is not predetermined by the government's enforcement rule. The guiding _ 
principle of the procedure is that the government treats consumers ' communi­
cations as if they are truthful representations of individual preferences. A 
consumer is penalized for attempted manipulations only in so far as they may 
result in restrictions on his ability to counter the subsequent reactions of 
other consumers. No direct costs are imposed by the government for attempted 
manipulations. 
For a wide class of neoclassical economies, this process always generates 
an asymptotic, first order Pareto efficient allocation of resources if 
consumers' behaviors satisfy a Cournot hypothesis. Moreover , the process 
always c onverges, regardless of how consumers behave, although the efficiency 
properties of the asymptotic equilibrium may be lost if consumers do not act 
as " rational" or consistent utility maximizing players. This convergence 
property is very much a consequence of the government's response rule, and 
therefore the dynamic nature of the enforcement structure is an integral part 
of the institutional design. The significance of the convergence property is 
two-fold: ( 1) overreactions and income effects, though permitted initially, 
are eliminated asymptotically, and (2) no consumer can be bankrupted in 
equilibrium if he only communicates financially feasible strategies at each 
iteration. The government's budget can always be balanced in equilibrium.5
Finally, the mechanis:n is individually incentive compatible ( in a qualitative 
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sense ). In section 4, we offer some criticisms of our results that are 
motivated by both practi cal and theoretical considerations, and we suggest 
some avenues for extension. Proofs of the technical lemmas cited in the text 
are relegated to an appendix. 
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2 .  THE MODEL 
The economi c system considered here is a simple two good neoclassical 
economy with a single public good and a government . The government's only 
objective (by assumption ) is to administer a well-defined program that 
provides for a Pareto efficient equilibrium allocation of resources to the 
production of the public good , financing this activity by taxing consumers. 
It is assumed further that the government has no apriori knowledge of 
consumers' preferences so that the government's primary problem is to elicit 
sufficient information from consumers to solve the efficiency problem. 
Ideally , each consumer 'WOuld respond "truthfully" to the government ' s  request 
for demand informati on, but it is well-known that this ideal is not attained 
(the free rider problem) unless it is in the consumer ' s  self-interest to 
communicate truth. To obtain efficient ,  possibly untruthful , information is a 
less formidable objective , although the revelation problem is still non­
trivial.6 To accomplish its objective , the government must adopt a program 
that is implementable; the program must provide for an adjustment procedure 
that ensures convergence to an efficient equilibrium even though individual 
consumers may try to exploit information they receive to manipulate the out-
come in their favor. In short , the program must include an intertemporal 
enforcement or punishment element that makes it irrational for consumers to 
continue to communicate inefficient , manipulative information even though any 
one misrepresentation may not be detectable at the ti.me it is coIIl!llunicated. 
2.1 The Economy 
Formally,  assume there are two commodities , a pure private good x and a 
pure public good y ,  N consumers (indexed i 2.. N ) , a single producer and a 
government . The commodity space is lR 2• + Each consumer is characterized by a
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utility function ui : 1R2 + lR ,  and an initial endowment of the private good,+ 
wi e: lR+; no agent holds an intial endowment of the public good y. The dif-
ference between the final and initial holdings of the private good by the ith 
consumer is denoted by a non-positive scalar z . , and his consumption of the 1 
private good by xi = wi + zi . It is assumed further that the private good x 
is an input used to produce y, and that constant returns to scale prevail. 
With suitable normalization , the input-output ratio can be set equal to one, 
so that the production equation becomes E z .  + y = o.7 
i < N 1 
A state of the economy may be represented by an (N+l) - tuple (x , y) = 
(x. , • • •  , x..; y) e:IRN+l , and the set of feasible states by the set1 N + 
W = { (x , y )  e: m.N+l : [ x. + y = [ w.}. The economy can then be 
+ i < N 1 i < N 1 
summarized by the list e
-
= { Cui , w . , i < NJ, w}. 8
1 -
Assunption 1. The economy e satisfies the following conditions: for each 
i 2.. N ,  
(a ) wi > O, and 
i 2 2 (b) u e: C (:R , lR ) such that i i - - i u (xi,y) � u (xi1y) implies u (xi(A) ,y(A) ) > 
i - - i 
u (xi,y) and u (xi1y)
0 <A< 1 where xi(A)
2.2 The Government 
i - - i i - -> u (xi,y) implies u (xi(A) ,y(A ) ) > u (xi,y) for
AX . + (1-A) x. and y(A) = AY + (1-A) y .1 1 
The government's plan for determining the output level of the public good 
and the financing of this activity consists of an abstract message space , an 
allocation (or outcome) rule , individual tax rules , and an enforcement rule . 
The message space establishes the language for which the plan is defined; 
consumers must select the messages they communicate to the government from 
this space. The allocation and tax rules evaluate the messages transmitted by 
consumers and then specify , respectively, the allocation of resources to 
production of the public good and the individual consumer tax burdens. The 
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enforcement rule stipulates how the allowable messages for each consumer are 
to be revised over time based on the previous position of the economy as given 
by the previous set of allowable messages and the co�sumers' message selection 
from this set .  
When choosing an enforcement rule and an initial message space, the 
government may utilize any general economic information that it already has. 
We assume that the government knows the production equation and the 
equilibrium price ratio which is one, thereby avoiding the problem of price 
ad justment dynamics. Definition 1 formalizes the notion of the government's 
economic plan for provision of the public good . 
Definition 1 Let A be an index set, and let M : { Mo.CM :CY.EA} be a collection
of subsets of M.  The economic plan admin istered by the government is given by 
a list G = { M , F ,  (Ci , i � N ) ,  E} where 
( a )  M = X M .  is the initial message space ; 
i < N 1 
(b )  F : M + Ill, F(m)  = y is the allocation rule; 
( c )  ci : M + JR, Ci (m) = c . , i < N are the consumers' tax rules ;
l. -
( d )  E : M X M + M , E (Mo. , m) = Mf3 for o. ,f3  EA is the enforcement rule.
When selecting messages to send to the government , consumers may 
knowingly select messages that misrepresent their true preferences . H owever , 
the ability of a consumer to perpetrate a misrepresentation depends on whether 
it is detectable , and this in turn depends on the government ' s  enforcement 
structure . One can think of the enforcement structure as being modeled 
implicitly in terms of the allowable misrepresentations . Thus , any 
restrictions on the set of permissible messages at a given point in time 
constitutes an implicit enforcement structure at that time. And , any rule 
that alters the restrictions on the set of permissible messages over time 
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defines a dynami c enforcement structure . Therefore , in Definition 1, a 
dynamic enforcement structure is given by the triple (M, M ,  E) where M is the 
universal or base message space , M is a collection of subsets of M, and E is a 
function that a ssociates with each set of currently permissible messages 
H o. E: M and each possible vector of individual messages selectable by consumers
m E: Ha C M, a set H13 E M of p ermissible messages for the next iteration .  If 
Ho. C M a for all t � O, at E: A, then E ( • ) is said to define an evolving t+l t 
enforcement structure. We assume that any message selected from outside the 
permissible set by a consumer is immediately detectable by the government , and 
that such action results in a prohibitively large fine , effectively placing 
the action outside the c onsumer's choice set. 
2.3 The Dynamics 
For the model to include a well-defined dynamical system, additional 
structure must be imposed on both consumers ' behaviors and the interaction 
between consumers and the government . In the system developed here, the 
government initiates the adjustment process by coDllllunicating to consumers an 
economi c plan G and an initial message vector m0 E: M. Using this informa­
tion ,  each consumer i responds with a message mil E Mil = Ei (M, m0) ,  which
the government then uses in the economic plan G to compute a tentative public 
good production y1 , ind ividual tax burdens cil• i � N ,  and revised message 
spaces Mi2 = Ei (M1 , m1) where 
M1 = i
1
N 
Mil and m1 = (mil' i � N) .  This
completes the first iteration of the process . The tth iteration begins when 
the government informs consumers of the results of the ( t-l) st iteration, viz. 
yt-1 ' ( ci t-1' i� N ) ,  mt-1 and 
Mt = E (Mt-1 ' mt-1).
A consumer ' s  best responses to the information he might receive from the 
government may be sUI!l!larized in the form of a set-valued response rule: 
-9-
si : {G}x M x M -+  Mi, s
i (G, Mt ' mt-l ) : {miJ C Mit" The particular char­
acteristics of this response rule will be determined by the behavioral.stra-
tegy selected by the consumer . Let S = (Si, i < N )  • 
Definition 2. A dynamical system for an economy e relative to an economic 
plan G is given by a list D = (M, M, E, S) . For each initial condition m e: 
0 
M, a dynamical system D will be associated with two trajectories : 
(a ) a real trajectory given by the sequence, { (xt, yt ) ,  t.:'._ l} where
yt = F (mt) and xt = (xit ' i.S. N )  = (wi - cit, i.'.:_ N ) ,
( b )  a message trajectory given b y  the sequence, {Mt ' mt ' t > O }  where
Mt+l = E (Mt, mt) and mt+l e: S (G, E (Mt ' mt ) ' mt ) .
The economic system can now be summarized by the list E = (e, G, D) , and 
the equations of motion for the system are given by the response rules Y (E) = 
(E, S ) .  
2. 4 Equilibrium, Optimality and Incentive Compatibility
A non-cooperative equilibrium of an economic system E is a feasible 
position of the system given by a (3 N + 1 ) -tuple (x•, y•, M*, m•) e: :mN+l 
x M x H that is unchanged by the equations of motions y (E). An equilibrium 
occurs when no consumer can improve his own situation (in terms of his 
response'rule) by a unilateral action that is permissible under the given 
enforcement rule . In other words, m• is a best replay or Nash equilibrium 
with respect to the response rules S (G, H*, • ) and the message space M*. This 
does not mean that m• is a Nash equilibrium relative to the base message space 
M, nor does it necessar ily follow that M* is a degenerate set. Formally, we 
say that, 
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Definition 3 .  (x•, y•, M*, m•) e: W x M x M is a non-cooperative equilibrium 
for the economic system E if 
(a) M* = E (M*, m*); 
(b) for each i .::_ N, mi• e: si (G, M*, m•) ;
(c ) for each i < N, F (m*/m . ) = F (m•) and Ci (m*/m. ) = Ci (m•) for all - 1 1 
m .  e: Si (G , M*, m•) where (m*/m. ) is the vector m• with ith1 1 -
• • • • component mi, i . e . m*/mi = Cm1, • • •  , mi-1 ' mi , mi+l' • • •  , mN ) ;
( d) ( x• , y• ) = ( w - C ( m• ) , F ( m• ) ) 
• 
We say that (M*, m•) is an E-Nash equilibrium for the system , thus indicating 
the possible dependence of the Nash equilibrium nature of m• on the enforce­
ment rule E .9 Observe that if E is an evolving enforcement rule , then M* 
reflects the complete adjustment history since M* = lim E (Mt , mt) =t 
is then well-defined . 10
lim Mt+lt 
Social performance of the process is measured by Pareto optimality as 
conventionally defined . Given an economy e, denote the set of feasible 
allocations (x, y) that satisfy the first order conditions for Pareto 
optimality by 6 (e ), called the (first order) Pareto set for e.  For e as 
defined in section 2 . 1  above, (x, y) e: e (e) if 
'Oui(a) for each i .s_ N, A i h. (xi, y )  = 1,1 
(b) 
aui L >.. . -,.. -· (x., y ) = li.'.:_N ioy i 
(c)  (x, y) e: W, 
and only if 
where the>.. . , i < N are utility weights, not all zero . 11
1 -
In choosing a definition of individual incentive compatibility, our 
motive is to emphasize the incentive characteristics for agents ' responses in 
equilibrium instead of their incentives while adjustments are occurring. 
Thus, ind ividual incentive compatibility_ ·of an allocation mechanism G for an 
economy e is defined at equilibria of the economic system However the 
_ , , _ 
formulatiai is in terms of a class of consumer response rules that satisfy a desires at each time t provided it is legally permissi ble (property (a) ),  is 
rational behavior hypothesis and feasibility constraints . The formulation is financially feasible for some permissible response of the other agents 
technically different from that of Hurwicz (1972) and Ledyard (1974), but is (property (b) ( i ) ), and is designed to maximize his true preferences for some 
conceptua lly similar in that a wi de c lass of non-competitive response rules is permissible response of the other agents (property ( b ) ( ii ) ) .  This last re-
allowed . 
Definition 4. Let m-it = (mlt' • • • , m( i-l)t' m ( i+l)t' • • • , �t ) and
M ·t = 
X M.t for each t > 1. F or each m "t E: M "t ' let C
i (m .t ) = -1 j �N J - -1 -1 -l. 
Hi 
{m.t E: M . t : C
i (m it' m.t ) < w.}, and let S =
 
l. l. - l. - l. 
X Si where, for each i < N,
i< N 
Si is the class of
(a)  mit E: S 
i
(b)  for each 
( i )  
( ii )  
response rules Si (•)  such that
(G, Mt, mt-l) implies mitE: Mit, and
m . t E: S
i (G, Mt ' mt 1-), there exists m ·t E: M "t such thatl. - . -l. -l. 
i mit E: C (m_it ) '
ui (xi,
all mit
F Cm it ' m . t ) )> u
i (5C., F Cm "t' m . t ) )  for- l. - l. -l. l. 
E: Ci (m . t ) where x .  = w i - C
i Cm . t, m .  t ) • -l. l. -l. l. 
A mechanism G is individually incentive compati ble in e if, for all S E: S, the 
response rules y(E) = (E, S) generate an equilibrium at which each consumer i 
is communicating a local representation of his true preferences . 
To interpret Definition 4, recall that generally an allocation mechanism 
is said to be individually incentive compatible if no agent can improve his 
situation by following non-competitive behavior. Both Hurwicz and Ledyard 
interpret this to mean that no consumer should be able to obtain a preferred 
allocation ( relative to his true preferences)  by behaving as if his prefer-
ences are different from what they are while other consumers behave according 
to their true preferences.  Definition 4 does not say this! Definition 4 
permits each consumer to communicate essentially any preference strategy he 
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quirement mere ly asserts that no agent should knowingly select a strategy that 
can only lead to an allocation that is less preferred than the minimum he can 
achieve regardless of the strategies selected by the other agents . 
It would seem then that this is a straightforward generalizati on of the 
Hurwicz and Ledyard static formulations . This is not quite true because our 
final criterion is only that each agent be communicating local truth in 
equilibrium; this does not mean that some agent's equili brium allocation 
cannot be improved as a consequence of communicating untruthful information 
during the ad justment process . To strengthen the definition to exclude this 
possibility would make an investigation of the incentive compatibility of G 
very difficult because of the nature of the adjustment process . 
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3 .  A CXlNVERGENT DEMAND-REVEALING ECONOMIC SYSTEM 
In this section, we present an economic system that always converges to 
an allocation in e ( e ), characterized by a balanced government budget and no 
consumer bankruptcy . Consumers' response rules are defined by a simple 
Cournot behavioral hypothesis, and the government's economic plan requires 
that consumers report willingness to pay s chedules for the public good. The 
all ocation and tax rules are similar to rules that have been considered in a 
static framework by Groves-Ledyard (1977 ),  Groves-Loeb ( 1975) and Suchanek 
(1977 ) .  The enforcement rule imposes an intertemporal consistency on the 
willingness to pay s chedules reported by consumers, given the allocation and 
tax rules . 
The allocation rule is designed to select a level of public good pro-
duction that m�ximizes reported consumer surplus, and the tax rules assess 
each consumer the difference between the cost of the public good and the 
aggregate willingness to pay for the public good reported by the other 
consumers plus a lump sum balancing payment (which may be negative ) .  Thus,  
for each vector of agents' messages, these rules compute a level of public 
good production and a corresponding vector of individual tax burdens . Impli-
cit in the message transmitted by each consumer is a s chedule of reported 
marginal valuations for the public good . The enforcement rule binds each 
consumer to the tax burden - public good level correspondence computed at 
each iteration for all future iterations by restricting the subsequent sets 
of permissible messages. 
There fore, if a consumer communicates a strategic message at some point 
in time that misrepresents his true willingness to pay for the public good 
level computed, then he must continue to transmit messages that communicate 
this misrepresentation, even if the other consumers react in such a way that 
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he is made worse off in the future . Consumers may, however , change their 
reported marginal valuations for the public good within certain limits that 
become more restrictive over time. The principal theorems in this section 
state that all consumers communicate marginal truth in the limit, under 
various behavioral assumptions, from which it follows that the limiting 
allocation is Pareto efficient . Throughout the following analysis , let the 
economy e be as defined in Section 2 . 1 .  
3 . 1  An Economic Plan 
Let c2( E, I!) denote the set of all twice differentiable functions from E. 
into F., and let t denote time . 
Definition 5. Let M be the set of all subsets of M, and let K1, K2, K3 , be
positive constants . Define G* = {M, F, (Ci, i � N ) ,  E } by 
I 
(a )  M = X M .  where M .  
i<N J. J. 
2 
= {mi e: c (la I!): mi( O )  = O ;  1 < m� ( O )  < K1;
0 < m� (y)  and - K2 � mj'. (y)  � -K3<o for all y .::_O}for all i � N;
(b)  for each t .::_ 0 and mt e: M, F (mt) = yt > 0 where yt maximizes
[I i�N mit (y) - y].
( c )  for each t .::_ 1, (ms e: M, s � t) and i � N, C
i(ms, s 
� t) = 
F (mt) -
= Yt -
l m .t (F(mt ) )  +IT. Cm , s < t-1)j t- i J ]. s -
j < N 
l mjt (yt ) + rr . (m , s < t-1 ) ;j =f i ]. s -
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(d) for each t �l, Mt+l = E(Mt, mt) 
= 
where, for all i < N, 
(i) Mil = Mi, 
X E. (Mt, mt) = i < N 1 X M i < N ic+l 
(ii) Mi2 ={mi E: Mil: mi2(yl) 
= mil (yl) and mi2(yl) .S. mil (yl)} 
where y1 = inf {y E: :R+: l mil(y) .S. y}, i.S.N 
(iii) Mit+l ={mi E: Mit: mit+l(yt) = mit(yt)} if t > 2• 
Under the economic plan G*, the base message space Mi for each consumer 
i is the set of all twice differentiable, strictly concave real-valued 
functionals with tmiformly bounded first and second derivatives. At each time 
t, the allocation rule selects the public good level yt that maximizes the
d ifference between consumers' aggregate reported willingness to pay for the 
public good and the production costs (i.e., consumers' surplus). Existence of 
the Yt for each t is ensured by the tmiform bounds on the derivatives of the 
permissible messages, making both the allocation rule and the tax rules well-
defi ned, provided the lump sum components ni are well-defined.
The purposes of the ni are to avoid consumer bankruptcies and to bal­
lance the government's budget in equilibrium, thereby ensuring feasibility of 
the limiting allocation and the validity of Pareto efficiency as a measure of 
performance, wh ile not influencing consumers' decisions in the margin. Two 
things are to be noted at this point. Firstly, the ni are (potentially) 
functions of the entire adjustment history, and secondly, the ni have not 
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been specified. The first observation permits a specification of the ni 
that we prefer for normative rea sons, although it is more easily critic�zed 
than alternative formulations. Yet, these balance terms are critical in the 
operation of the dynamic process, and for justification of our results. 
Therefore, we have elected to defer consideration of the balance terms until 
later in this section, which also permits us to distinguish more easily the 
generic properties of G* that derive from the enforcement rule E and the 
properties of the tax rules. 
The enforcement rule E(·) defines an evolving enforcement structure 
which, for each sequence of play, yields a nested sequence of sets Mit' 
t > 1 for each i < N. Each successive element Mit+l in the sequence 
depend s directly on the preceeding element Mit' the message selected by the 
consumer mit' and the public good level Yt generated by the allocation 
rule F(•) given the messages selected by all agents mt. For each i, Mil 
is the base message space; Mi2 is the sub set of Mil that consists of the 
functions that preserve i's reported willingness to pay for y1 as 
communicated by mil' his first message selection, and that do not 
communicate a willingness to pay 
for y1 that exceed s mi1Cy1). (Notice that y1 is such that L1·.s.N mi1Cy1), =Yi, 
i.e., y1 is the public good level where reported consumers' surplus is zero at 
t = 1. The bound s on the derivatives ensure that y1 exists and is unique.) 
M13 
is the subset 
where y2 maximizes 
of M12 that p reserves i's reported willingness to pay for y2 
[I i.S.N mi2 (y) - y J, and so on for t = 3, II, • • • • There-
fore, an intertemporal sequence of consistent message selections for each 
consumer i must be such that m. (yt) = m.t(yt) for all s > t 
> 1 and m. (y1) < 1S 1 - - 1S -
m. Cy1) for all s > 1. The purpose of y1 is technical: to limit considerationil -
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to public good levels belonging to a compac t set that is endogenously deter­
mined by consumers themselves, given the production technology. 
Lemna 1. Let m
0 
e: M be an arbitrary initial condition, and let { Mt, mt, t .::_ l} 
be a message trajec tory associated with m
0 
by an economic system E = (e, G•, 
D). Then E has the following properties independent of e and S (the economic 
environment and consumer response rules, respec tively): 
(i) there exists a unique set M• e: M such that Mt t M•; 
(ii) there exists a unique 2-tuple (y•, k•) e: ll� such that (yt' 
[I . mit c Y t) - Y t] > 1 c y• • k•) : l <N 
• • 
(iii) there exists a unique (N + 1)-tuple (y ; k., i < N) such thatl -
• • 
(yt; mit(yt)' i � N) t (y ; ki, i � N);
(iv) if the sequence {yt} contains a sub-sequence {yt} such thatn 
Yt =/= Yt for h=/= n, then n h 
• • 
(a) there exists a unique (N + 1)-tuple (y ; ri, i � N) such that
(yt; mi_t(yt)' i� N) � 
• • • • 
(b) for all m e: M , mi(y ) = 
• 
and Li_iN ri=l;
• 
( y• ; r 1 , i :5.. N ) , and 
• *-- *ki' mi (y ) * ri 
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(v) if, for each i < N, either m� (yt) < m� (yt) for all s > v > t such - lS - lV - -
that yt = y = y , or mi� (yt) > m� (yt) for all s > v > t such that S V - S - lV - -
• • 
yt = ys = Yv' then there exists a unique (N+l)-tuple (y ; ri, 
i :5.. N) such that (yt; m�t (yt), i :5.. N) +t 
• • 
(y ; ri' i�N).
Lemma 1 establishes the general convergence properties of the economic 
plan G•. Intuitively, the enforcement rule E ( • )  is a procedure for eliciting 
information from consumers sufficient to construct indivi dual willingness to
pay schedu les that permit the government to successively approximate a unique
public good level y• and vec tor of reported individual valuations (ki
•, 
i.:5.. N), u sing the allocation and tax rules. Whether a unique vec tor of
individua l marginal valuations of y• is similarly approximated can depend on
agents' response rules. Technically, this means that there exist response 
rules S(•) that will generate a periodicity asymptotically in the marginal 
valuations consistent with (y•; ki
•' i :5._N). However, this cannot happen if 
S( · ) e: S and if each Si(·) satisfies a consistency axian which effectively 
restricts consecu tive direc tional changes in the reported marginal valuations 
for repeated tentative allocations of the public good. Thus, the same result
can be achieved by the government if it adopts the following, more restrictive
enforcement rule: 
Definition 5(d'). for each i, Ei(Mt' mt) = Mit+l 
={mi e: Mit: mi(yt) = mit(yt)
and m{Cyt) .::_ m;t(yt)}. 
- 1 9-
The uniform boundedness imposed on the derivatives of allowable messages 
by the constants K1 , K2, K3 is the technical feature of the enforcement 
structure that literally forces convergence of the economic system, given, of 
course , the government's intertemporal reporting consistency requirement .  To 
justify the use of these constants, we merely observe that they mean the 
government has assumed that individual preferences satisfy certain general 
properties, at least locally in a common region. K1 means that no individual 
places an infinite value on an infinitesimal amount of the public good; K2 and 
K3 mean that the reported marginal rate of substitution in consumption of y 
for x cannot change arbit_rarily quickly or too slowly , regardless of the rela-
tive consumptions of these commodities. In short , the reported intensity of 
preference of  any consumer for the public good can never be too great or too 
small, nor can it change too drastically in a small region. Thus, these restric-
tions are simply regularity conditions on reported preferences . If agents behave 
as truthtellers , the restrictions will limit the set of potential equilibrium 
allocations to those that are in a region where consumers' marginal utility functions 
satisfy a uniform boundedness criterion corresponding to K1• Notice,  too, that this 
emphasizes that the government is attempting only to approximate the true state of 
affairs locally ; the curvature restriction imposes no theoretical barrier to exis-
tence, nor does it imply. that the government must have apriori knowledge of con-
sumers' utility functions . 
Lemma 1 shows that the vector of balance terms TI= (TI., i < N) has no impact 1 -
on the general convergence properties of the economic system. However, 
they are obviously critical for the questions of budget balance and consumer 
bankruptcy . Clearly, to balance the government's budget in equilibrium, these 
terms must be functions of the information communicated by consumers .  This 
introduces the possibility of income effects that could affect the intended 
incentive structure of the economic plan if a consumer is sophisticated and 
can learn enough to manipulate the economic system. Generally, this problem 
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is assumed away in one form or another, often by making each Ili a function
only of the mj, j =Fi, and then assumi ng that each consumer takes other 
c onsumers' messages as given (a Cour not competitive behavior assumption). 
This formulation is obviously not immune to the sophisticated consumer 
c riticism.13 Still, it is the approach we pursue here, but with a twist: 
the enforcement structure E(·) forces c onvergence of the economic system so 
that the TI. too will have to converge if they are functions of the m. only
1 J 
i ndirectly through the allocation rule. Moreover, this permits us to i nclude 
in each Ili the ith consumers �messages, although this is not necessary to
14 obtain any princ ipal result. It does, however, yield an intuitively 
acceptable distribution of the cost of the public good. 
Defi nition 6. For each t � 1, Ilc(mt-l) = (Ilic(mt_1), i < N) where 
Ilic (mt-1) = l j .=:_N mjt-1 (yt-l)[l 
j ;Li 
- ( h .::_N 1 . }t-ll 
Theorem 1. Let all starred values be as defined by lemma 1 ,  and let Ci(·) 
be as given by defi nition 5(c) where Ili = Ilic for each i .::_ N. Then, for
all i .::_ N, 
(i) 
(ii) 
(iii)
an ic (mt-1) 
a mit 
- O, all t > l; 
1 ( .; ) • lim C (mt (y i)) = l • Y ; t+ oo h .::_ N kh 
lim 
t+ 00 
. . 
l i < N Ci (mt ( y t) ) = y • 
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Proof. (i) follows immediately from definition 5(d) since mt(Yt-l) = 
mt-l (yt-l) all t. To obtain (ii), just apply the limit operation to C
i( 
and appeal to lemma 1: 
lim Ci(mt(yt)) = t 
lim Yt t 
Ij., i l� mjtcyt> +
l lim m 
j =l=i t jt-1 
[ 
Ij + i lim mjt-1 <Yt-1>] 
(y ) - t lim y t-l lh .::_ N l� mht-1 (yt-1) t t-l 
= y - J 1 i • (1 T k
•
) 
Ih.::_N kh 
k. • 
( . ) 
= 
Ih .::_
1
N k: 
y 
• 
(iii) follows imnediately from (ii).// 
• 
y 
Defi nition 6 states that each consumer i will receive a lump sum payment 
at t (provided c ontracting occurs) equal to the difference between other 
consumers' reported willingness to pay for the tentative public good level 
Yt-l and their percentage of the total reported willingness to pay the 
production cost of Yt-l• 
Two features of Ile should be noted: at each t, it 
is a function only of mt-l evaluated at yt-l' values that are fixed by the
government for all time, and Ilic is a function of mjt-l(yt_1>, all j .::_ N. How-
ever, these features do not c reate o bvious d ifficulties, regardless of agents' 
response rules, precisely because the values are fixed for all time by the 
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government. Indeed , Theorem 1 shows that, (i) the Ilic are incentive neutral 
at each iteration, a consequence of the enforcement structure, (ii) each 
consumer's percentage of the cost of providing the public good is 
asymptotically well-defined and equal to his proportion of society' s aggregate 
reported willingness to pay for the public good, and (iii) society' s tax 
burden in the limit is equal to the government's cost of providing the public 
good . Theorem 1 does not depend on the characteristics of agents' response 
rules. 
Therefore, income eff ects and consumer overreactions cannot cause a 
violation of any general convergence property. Still, one might ar gue that 
Ile is an tmdesirable specification of the balance terms because a sophis� 
ticated consumer would be able to ea sily manipulate the distribution of costs 
at any point in time. But, this is precisely what is not true. Consider the 
following specification of the balance terms: 
Defi nition 6'. For each t > 1, Il (m , s < t-1) = (Il. (m , s < t-1), i < N) - a s  - ia s - -
s < t-1) = whelre n ia ms• -(•;, <r,l ) I j'fi Is�t-1 t-1 [ 1 - I r, ]s.::_t-1 t-l �s(ys) • lh.::_N ls�t-1  
No consumer can easily manipulate the term Ilia at any given point in 
time since the impact of any one message on the value of Ilia goes to zero as 
t approaches infinity. Yet, it is straightforward to show that theorem 1 is 
also valid for n = Ila' a consequence of the following well-known result: 
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Lemma 2. If a sequence of numbers an converges to a, then the sequel}"Ce of
a implies lim 
The Cournot response rule is a competitive response rule; each consumer 
accepts the previous communications of other agents as parametric to his behav-
arithemetic means {' T an } conver ges to a.Ln=l T That is, lim an = T+ . • 
= ior. To see that Si (G , • , • ) is well-defined, for each t > 1, let Y. = 
I
T 
n=l 
an
T 
= a. 
We conclude the enforcement rule E(•) circumvents the problem of income 
effects by eliminating asymptotically each agents' ability to manipulate his 
c - it 
{ y e: 1R+: y = F(mt_11mit), some mit e: Mit } • Then,
Lemma 3, For each t .::_ 1, Yit is non-empty and compact, all i< N. 
· Since the Lagrangean 
Lt
i(x., y) = ui(x., y)'- p
i(y - '· .,L ·  mjt 1Cy) + n.(mt 1l + x. - w.)1 i LJ �i - 1 - i 1 
income level directly. However, potentially substantial own income variations is continuous in y for each t where x.= w. + z. is a simple residual, it . 1 1 1 
can be forced by any agent initially during the adjustment process. 
3.2 Consumer Behavior and Incentive Compatibility 
Theorem 1 shows that budget balance is a generic equilibrium property of 
an economic system E = (e, G•, D). In this section, we explore the 
equilibrium properties of E when certain restrictions are placed on consumers' 
response rules. Briefly, we show that if consumers are either Cournot players 
follows from lemma 3 that, for each t and each i, there is a feasible utility 
maximizing message. We now state two technical lemmas that are used to prove 
optimality of the Cournot economic system. 
Definition 7. 
. . 
for each i � N, t .::_ 1, and mit e: S� (G , Mt, mt_1), define
- - 2 the 2-tuple (xit'Yit) to be the values of (xi, y) e: lR+ that satisfy the
or, are generally, consistent utility maximizers, then E converges to a Pareto following conditions: 
efficient E-Nash equilibrium allocation; we show also that G• is incentive 
compatible. 
Assumption 2 (Cournot Hypothesis). For each t .::_ 1, i � N, mite: S� (G•, Mt,
i i A ( 
A 
mt-l) ={mi e: Mit: u (xi, F(mt_11mi) ) .::_ u (xi, F mt_1!mi)) all mi e: Mit 
i i A such that O < C (mt_1/mi) = wi - xi, 0 � C (mt_11mi) =
s! (G*,·,·}·is called �he Cournot Response Rule. 
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wi - xi}
(a) 
(b) 
Lemma 4.
yit maximizes [mit (y) + Ij ;ii mjt-1 Cyl - Y J. 
i.e. yit = F(mt_11mit), and
xit = wi-C
i (mt-1'/mit) .::_ O .
h • Let �t e: Sc (G , Mt, mt-l) all h � N, t .::_ 1. 
-25-
If yt-l = yt some
t .::_ 1, then for each i, 
( i )  mit (yt-1 ) < m;t-1 (yt-1 ) implies m;t+l (yt-1 ) � 
m�t (y t-1 ), and
( ii )  m;t (yt-1 ) > m�t-1 (yt-1 ) implies m�t+l (yt-1 ) >
Lemma 5. 
mit (yt-1) .
For each i � N, lim yit =t 
lim Yt • t 
• Lemma 4 establishes a choice consistency property of Cournot behavior 
relative to the government plan G• . E ssentially, it says that if, at some 
time t, the ith consumer ' s  response to the previous message selections 
re fl ects a desired decrease ( respectively, increase) in the level of the 
public good to be provided, then so will his next response at (t+l) should 
other consumers react at time t so as to cancel the impetus for change 
communicated by him at t. Because the uniform strict concavity limitation on 
allowable messages restricts the extent to which this can happen, the 
existence of unique individual asymptotic marginal valuations follows from 
lemnata 1 and 5 .  
Lemma 5 establishes the asymptotic relationship between the Cournot 
responses of each consumer and the government's behavior as dictated by the 
economic plan G•. The lemma asserts that the feasible public good level 
desired by each consumer who is a Cournot player will coincide in the limit 
with the public good level provided by the government in accordance with the 
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economic plan G•. The result is not obvious, and requires the uniform strict 
concavity of allowable messages ; if linear messages are permitted, then.lemma 
5 is rx>t true in genera1 . 15
• Theorem 2 .  The neoclassical Cournot economic system Ec = (e, G , D) where
• • 
S = Sc converges to an E-Nash equilibrium (M , m ) such that the corresponding
• • 
equilibrium allocation (x , y ) is Pareto efficient and no consumer is bank-
• • • • 
rupt; i . e .  (x , y ) E: a ( e )  and w .  > Cl. (m ) > O all i < N .l.- -
Proof. 
• • 
The proof of theorem 2 essentially consists of showing that (x , y , 
• • • 
M , m ) satisfies definition 3, and that G is incentive compatible in equili-
brium in the restricted, static sense of Hurwicz and Ledyard,16 from which
• • 17it follows that (x , y )  E: B( e ) .  
• • • 
Let M = lim Mt which exists by lemma 1 .  By construction, M = X M . wherei N l. t 
• 
M . =  {m . E: M . :  m. E: n M . t} l. l. l. l. t>l l. • 
• • • 
To show that M = E (M ,m )--definition 3 ( a ) -- it 
suffices to show that 
( 2 )  
• • • • 
S(G , M , m) = M , all m E: M • 
• A • Suppose not . Then, for some i � N, m E: M , there exists mi E: Mi such that
i A A i • A 
u (x . ,  F (m/m. ) )  > u (x., F(m ) )  and Cl.(m/m.) = w. - x.. But, this means that
l. l. l. - l. l. l. 
F(m/;. )  f F (m )  for otherwise, Ci (m/; . )  = Ci (m) and xi = x . ,  a contradiction.l. l. l. 
It follows that there exists E: > 0 and T > 0 such that I F(mt ) - F (mt/mit+l ) I > E: 
for all t.::. T, a contradiction of lemma 5 .  This establishes (2 ). 
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Observe that definition 3(b) and 3(c) also follow as consequences of 
(2). By lemmata 1 and 5, these conditions are all non-vacuous. 
. . . 
Now, by the Cournot hypothesis, w. > C1(mt 1tm.t) > 0 for m.t E S1(G ,1- - l. - l. 
Ht, mt_1), all t > 1 and i < N. Thus, w. > lim C
i(mt 1tm.t) > O, and hence
l. - t - l. -
w. > lim ci(mt) > O by lemmata 1 and 5. Because of theorem 1, we can writel. - t 
• • • 
this more simply as w. > • 
( i k. ) 
i- lh < N � 
y � 0 where, by (2), k = mi(yi)' all
• 
mi E Mi, all i .::._ N. Hence, w. > c
i(m�) > O all i, showing that no consumer is
l. - 1 
-
bankrupt. 
• 
Since, further, xi 
= 
. . 
w. - C1(m.) by construction for all i,
1 l. 
tion 3(d) is established. 
• • 
Thus, (M , m ) is an E-Nash equilibrium. 
• • 
It remains for us to show that (x , y )E S(e). Under the Cournot 
defini-
hypothesis, for each t, each consumer i selects a message mit--which here
determines xit as a residual--to maximize the Lagrangean 
i i Lt (xi, mi) 
= u (xi, F(mt_11mi)) 
i - pi(xi + C (mt_/mi
) - wi).
That is, i selects (x.t' m.t)E 
lR X H.t such thatl. l. + l. 
(3) (a) u! (xit' F(mt-1/mit)) = pi'i 
i - i(b) um. (xit' F(mt-11mit)) = p i cm. (mt-11mit).
l. l. 
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This choice problem is well-defined by lemma 3. 
Since Ci m.
l. 
(mt_/mit) = 
• 
1 -
dm 
-
I · . � 
Cyit>
J /.1 dy = 
(y ) dmit it under the dy 
Cournot hypothesis and G , it follows from lemmata 1, 4 and 5 that 
i (4) (a) u x.1 
i (b) u m. 
l. 
• • 
(xi, F(m )) = Pi'
• • • 
(xi, F(m ))
= Pi ri,
• • 
• 
where F(m ) 
• 
= y 
• 
and ri
= 
:;i (y ) 
= l" 
dmit(yt)im --
t dy 
for all i .::._ N. Clearly, 
li.::._N 
• 
ri
= 1, a simple limit result. 
- . . 
-1 Letting :>.. i = Pi
conditions (l)(a) - (d). Thus, (x , y ) E e (e).// 
for each i .::._ N yields  
Observe that 4(b) means that each consumer is  implicitly connnunicating in 
the limit his true marginal willingness to pay for the equilibrium public good 
level y•. In short, when viewed statically, the mechanism G* is individually 
incentive compatible in the sense of Hlll'Wicz (1972) and Ledyard (1974). This 
follows since the Cournot hypothesis in equilibrium is indistinguishable from 
the static competitive behavior assumption of Hurwicz and Ledyard, and because 
a consumer here could act over time as if he is communicating demand 
information consistent with virtually any concave utility function, not just 
his true utility function. 
A stronger incentive compatibility-efficiency result is possible. 
Theorem 3, below, establishes that G* is individually incentive compatible in 
the sense of definition 4, provided consumers' behaviors satisfy a choice 
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consistency or monotonicity property. This is equivalent to showing that G* 
is an efficient economic plan that does not induce waste or bankruptcy for a 
large class of consumer response rules. 
Implicit in the ith consumer's Cournot response rule is the expec tation 
by i at each time t that the response of other consumers at (t-1) will be 
reco111Dunicated. Similarly, some notion of expec tation must be implicit in 
each response rule belonging to the classes si, i < N. For each i and each
Si, there is a particular expec tation formulation that associates with each 
set of possible responses for other consumers and the previous communications 
a subset consisting of an equivalence class of their expected responses: 
n .: M . X M + M  . where n .(M ·t• mt 1) = �.tc: M it" That is, a specific1 -i -1 1 -i - . -1 -
expectation correspondence ni and utility maximizing behavior together fully
determine a unique Si E Si. We focus in theorem 3 below on the sub-class of
response rules which, with their associated expec tation correspondence, 
(ii) 
1 dmjt <yt).::.. I . dmjt-1 <yt-1), and j#i dy j ;Ii dy 
s dmjt+l (yt) dmjt (yt) . l
j#i dy � 
l
j#i dy if 
l dmjt (yt)
j#l dy 
< L
· . 
dmjt-1 <yt-1)
�#1 dy • or 
ani (M_it, m)
am 
- O all t .::_ 1. 
The axiom of consistency is a regularity condition on the expectations 
correspondence n.(•) implicit in S
i(·). Essentially, the aJCiom requires
1 
satisfy a consistency property that ensures conver gence of the individual that each consumer's expec tations be feasible,and that it exhibit Cournot -like 
marginal valuations, or equivalently rules out cyclical communication behavior. behavior when consecutive communications result in the same tentative 
Definition 8. Si E S i satisfies the axiom of consistency when 
(a) M-�t CM-it for all t�l, and
(b) if yt-l = yt for some t .::_ 1, then m:it+l E M-�t+l implies
(i) 
s dmjt+l (yt) > dmjt (yt)l j #i dy - l j#i dy if 
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allocation being computed by the government. More specifically, it requires 
that expec ted communications reflec t an expec tation that the aggregate
marginal valuations reported by other consumers will change in the same 
direc tion as occurred previously if the same tentative allocation is computed 
consecutively by the government. Moreover, it requires that a consumer's 
responses not change if the expec ted responses of others have not changed. 
Under the axiom, it is possible to show that individual decisions and the 
government's decision conform in the limit, thus ruling out cyclical strategy 
behavior that leaves the real position of the economy unchanged. 
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Lemma 6. 
(i) 
(ii) 
If si e: S
i satifies the axiom of consistency for all i < N ,  then 
l;:n mit (yt) exists, and 
lim Yit 
= 
t 
lim Yt t 
Theorem 4 establishes that there is an institutional design that forces 
convergence to an efficient equilibrium allocation if consumers pursue_a 
utility maximizing strategy regard less of the otherwise manipulative nature of 
their response rule. 
Theorems 2, 3 and 4 are valid independent of the initial cond ition m e: 
0 
where for each t � 1, yit is the value of y generated by s
i in accordance with M cominunicated by the government to begin the adjustment process, although the 
definition 7, and Yt is the value of y generated by G*.
Theorem 3. The neoc lassical economic system E = (e, G*, D), when Si satifies 
the axiom of con sistency for all i,converges to an E-Nash equilibrium (M*,m*) 
such that the correspond ing equilibrium all ocation (x•,y•) e: 9 (e) and wi > 
Ci(m*) � 0 all 1 � N,
The proof of theorem 3 parallels that of theorem 2, following from the 
equilibrium all ocation may clearly vary with the initial cond ition. 
Therefore, it is of i nterest to k now.whether the economic system is stable in 
the sense that two initial conditions that are close will result in equilibria 
that are al so close. Unfortunately, it appears that this is not the case. 
The reason for this is technical, and we dis cuss it further in the next
section. 
Finally , it may seem at first glance that the income effects issue has 
been finessed since direct manipulation of the balance terms ITi , i � N has not 
been modelled as part of the agents' messages choice problems .  If true, this 
application of le11111ata 1 and 6; one need only substitute m�it e: ni (M_it' mt-l) would raise the important question of whether the critical lemmata, 5 and 6,
for m in the proof to theorem 2. Observe that the Cournot response rule t-1 are valid when direct own-income manipulations are permitted . However , it is 
straightforward to show that the lemmata are still valid since the proofs are 
satisifies the axiom of consistency, making theorem 2 a corrollary of theorem independent of agents '  choice criteria; the proofs depend only on the outcome 
3. If the government adopts the more restric tive enforcement rule E(•) given rule and each agent's expectations of other agents' responses which are bind-
by definition 5(d'), then the following optimality theorem can be proven, 
again by paralleling the proof of theorem 2: 
Theorem 4. The neoclassical economic system E = (e, G', D) , where G' is 
defined by definition 5(a) - (c) and 5(d'), and where Se: S, converges to an 
E-Nash equilibrium (M*,m•) such that the corresponding equilibrium allocation 
(x•,y•) e: a (e) and w1 � c
1cm•) � o all i � N. 
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ing constraints at each time t regardless of the agent ' s  choice criteria. 
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4 .  CON CLUSION 
Much of the recent research on incentive compatibility, Pareto efficient 
allocation rules , and the free rider problem stem from the seminal paper by 
Groves-Ledyard (1977 ) ,  and ear lier , related papers by Groves (1973 ) and 
Groves-L oeb (1975 ). All of these efforts present a similarly structured 
institution designed to resolve efficiently different types of communal 
decision problems . One can in fact view the entire comparative statics demand 
revelation literature as a collec tion of exercises in optimal institutional 
design . This is not true of the limited work on the implementability problem 
which has sought primarily to resolve differences between the existing theory 
and the e xper imental convergence resul ts of Smith (1979) and others . The 
purpose of this paper is different : to develop an institutional structure 
that al ways leads to an efficient equilibrium allocation of resources , 
circumventing the barriers to theoretical convergence that plague less 
restrictive mechanisms , and to e xplore the relationship between agents ' 
response rules and the institutional design given convergence and efficiency 
requirements . Thus , we reemphasize the ec onomic policy nature of probable 
solutions to the basic efficiency problem confronting governments when viewed 
in a dynamic framewor k .  
The economic policy approach to the implementability issue is pragmatic, 
and permits mechanisms s uch as G• relative to which the economic system al ways 
converges to an efficient equilibrium for a wide class of economies without 
waste or bankruptcy of any agent in the process . Moreover , income effec ts 
need not be ass umed away , but can be eliminated asymptotically by appropriate 
specification of the government's economic plan .  How restric tive the 
government's enforcement rule must be to ach ieve these results depends on 
agents' response rules . But ,  theorem 4 shows that there d oes exist a 
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mechamism that will wor k for all utility maximizing response rules and a wide 
class of economies . 
Our results and the model are not immune to criticism . From a practical 
point of view , the procedure is tatonnement , and we have increased the 
informational load on the government of an already information intensive 
system. We do not thin k ,  however , that these shortcomings void the potential 
usefulness of the approach when applied to a small number of easily policed 
agents . 
From a theoretical point of view , the Model is naive and cumbersome, 
possessing no meaningful t heory of production , having only two goods , ignoring 
price ad justment pro blems in private good markets , and requiring consumers to 
communicate entire func tions . To generalize the Model to eliminate any of 
these criticisms is , we believe , technically non-trivial . 
From a po licy point of view ,  the mechanism G• has two undesirable 
charac teristics.  Although the mechanism is incentive compatible in 
equilibrium, the adjustment process is not necessarily incentive compatible. 
Some agent may be able to manipulate the iterative procedure to affect the 
equilibrium outcome significantly. On the other hand , Thomson's (1979) 
results are very suggestive , and it seems plausible that other agents may be 
able to counter-manipulate , e ssentially negating each individual agent's 
attempts at manipulative contro l.  How such a manipulative process migh t be 
affec ted by the inc reasing restrictions imposed on the sets of all owable 
messages over time by the government remains to be explored , although it seems 
clear that an agent's ability to manipulate the process varies inversely with 
the rate of convergence of the system . 
Finally, the economic system does not necessarily move from close initial 
conditions to close equilibrium a�locati ons .  Hence , the government cannot 
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manipulate the equilibrium distribution of income by varying the initial 
condition ,  depriving it of an o bvious p otential policy instrument . This 
problem arises because each agent ' s  set of possible (equivalent ) responses at 
APPENDIX 
any finite time is , l oosely speaking , too large . For example , at each time t ,  A. l . Notation 
a Cournot player i, can choose from an infinite number of time-specific 
equivalent responses designed to yield a desired allocation yit given the
previous co111Dunications of other agents at time ( t-1 ) .  However , most of �hese 
responses will result in different tentative allocations yt computed by the 
government given the actual responses of other agents at time t .  Because i ' s  
future messages ar e  restri
_
cted by each tentative allocation yt and his
choice of message mit ' widely divergent paths can emanate from the same
initial condition on two plays of the sanie tatonnement game ; messages that 
seemed equivalent at time t · to a player i viewing the history need not be 
equivalent to the same player at time ( t+s )  viewing the new history . Whether 
the process would tend to stabilize with multiple plays of the same game given 
the same initial condition (a supergame) remains to be determined . 
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To conserve space, we adopt the following notation for pre-
sentation of the proofs to the technical lemmas stated in the text : 
3 : there exists 
3 : such that 
implies ;:> -
I - unique 
- therefore 
¥ :: for each 
� : converges to 
A . 2 .  Proofs 
mt (y)
m� (y) 
Li.::_N mit (y)
Li.::_N mj_t (y)
m" (y) = L m "  (y)t i.::_N it 
m-it (y) = Lj#i mit (y)
m:it (y) Ij#im;_t cy>
Lemma 1 .  (i) follows since Mt+l C Mt all t .  Now observe that
{ (yt ' mt (yt) ) ,  t.::_O} is a bounded sequence . Hence ,  3 a convergent sub­
sequence { (y , m (y ) ) } . Let (y*,h*) = lim (y ,m (y ) ) .  To prove (ii) ,s s s s s s s 
we must show that all subsequences converge to (y* ,h*) . 
Suppose 3 a subsequence { (y ,m (y ) ) }  with limit (y,h) # (y* ,h*) . 't 't 't 
Define d = (m (y ) - y ) all t .  By definition 5 ,  { d  , t>l} is bounded,t t t t t -
monotone non-decreasing . :. 3 l d<= 3 d + d l>(h - y) = (h* - y*) . t 
without loss of generality , assume h > h*. Then , 
(5) (h - h*) =(y - y*) > o .
Let £ >  O .  3 integers J1(£) , J2 (£)
s .::_ J l(£)�1 I ins (ys) - h* I <  
I ys - y* j < E: /4 .
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< .. 3 
£/4 , 
Thus , 
T > J2 (e:)==5>1 1h - m (y ) I <  e:/4 ,- T T 
l"Y - y I < e: /4 .  T 
(6) (a) m (y ) - m (y ) I > lh" - h* 1 ·  - e:/2T T S S 
'cb) I Y - Y I > IY - Y* I - e:/2 ,  and l"Y - Y* I > I Y - y I -e:/2 .T S T S 
for s .::_ J1 (e: ) ,  T .::_ J2 (e: ) .  From (5) , (6) (a) , (b) , we have ,
(7) I m  (y ) - m (y ) I  > I Y  - Y I - e: .T T S S T S 
Let T .::_ J2 (e:) and s .::_ max (T ,  J1 (e:) ) .
and m� (yt) = 1 all t by construction of G*.
Then, ms (y,) = m, (y,)
• •. , by Taylor ' s  Theorem,
(8) m (y ) - m (y ) = (y - y ) m' (y ) + S T S S T S S S 
y J ' (y - y) m" (y) dy < (y - y ) (1 - K3/2)T S - T S ys
since m� (y) � -K3 < 0 all y .::_ 0 by definition. It follows from (5) ,
(6? (a) , (b) ,  (8) that 
(9) (a) m (y ) - m (y ) < (y - y ) (1 - K3/2) ,
T T S S - T S 
(b) m (y ) - m (y ) > IY - y* I - e:/2 .T T S S 
Now, let 0 < e: < 2K3 fy - Y* l / (4 + K3) . Then, 2K3 IY - y* J / (4 + K3)- 1 
1
-
I 
1 
1
- 1 .  = 2 K3 Y - y* / (1 + K3/4) ,  and thus e: < 2 K3 ( y - y* -e:/2)
< -2
1 K3 1 Y  - y I by (6) (b) . .� I Y - y I - e: > I Y - y I (1 - -2
1 K3) .T S T S T S 
The proof of (iii) is similar, following from the observations that 
y + y* and that I m .  (y ) - m .  (y ) I  = I m .  (y� ) - m .  (y > I t 1 T T 1S S 1 T • l. T S 
(2K1 + K3
) 
� I Y, - Ys l � • 
a consequence of Taylor ' s  Theorem and the definition of G* for -r > s .  
To prove (iv) , suppose 3 subsequences { (y , m .  (y ) ) } , { (y , m .  (y ) ) }"[ 1"[ "[ s 1S s 
* for some i < N m: (y ) + r .  and m: (y ) + r .  # r .  where y , y + y* by (ii) , 1T T 1 1S S 1 1 T S 
above . By hypothesis , we may assume without loss of generality that 
y + y and y # y all -r + ' s ' s + s, . "[Cl T B s O' SA Cl O' " 
Two cases are possible .  
Case I . 3 -r11 , 's • sA , arbitrarily large :3 Y, Cl
< y < y ;:>m: (y ) >sA ' s 1•11 ' a * It follows that r .  = r . .  m: (y ) > m: (y ) since mi' (y) < 0 all i, t .1SA SA 1-rB TB t 1 1 
Case II . 3 T , 's • s, , s , s arbitrarily large 3 y < y < y* < y < 11 " cr <; · 'a ' s st 
y < y and s� > ' s > s, > T > s �:;::,.0y 
definition of G* that 
SA SO' -- '> " Cl 
rJ 
[m.  (y ) - m .  (y )] 1TB 's 1T(l 'a , > m . 
Y, - Y, 1s<; 
B a 
which can be rewritten as, 
(y*) 
[
mi• (y, ) - mi• (y, )] B B B a 
Y, - Y, 
> m: (y*)1S<; 
B a 
[m .  (y ) - m .  (y ) ] 
> 
1s0 s0 1sA sA 
Ys - ys 
a A 
[
m.  (y ) - m .  (y 
)] 
> 
1T
B 
s0 1TB 
SA 
ys - ys 
a A 
But , Jy - Y'* I  -e:/2 > fy - y I - e: by (6) (b) .  Hence,  IY - y* J - e:/2 > * T s It follows that r . = ri .I 1 1 Y - Y I (1 - -2 �3) .  Thus ,  m (y ) - m (y ) > m (y ) - m (y ) by (9) (a) , (b) ,T S � T T S S . T T S S 
a contradiction. 
To prove (v) , it suffices to observe that either 3 a subsequence 
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{ yT} 3 YT 'I
Cl. 
y if T 'I T0 in which case (iii) above applies, or T
f3 
Cl. " 
where , by hypothesis , mit n 
E Mit ' mit n 
(y ) = r .  (y ) . By c onstruction oft l.t t 
{ , (y ) t > J} 
n n 3 J < ... 3 yt = ys all t ,  s � J in which case the sequence mit t ' - G* , {mit ( • ) } is uniformly bounded .is monotone by hypothesis , and hence converges . // n , for n=l ,  
3 qil < '"' and a subse-
quence {m .  } C { m .  } 3 m: t (y1) + q . 1 , for n=2 , 3 q . 2 < '"' and a subse-it it i n1 i i n1 n n1 Lemma 2 . Let E > 0 be given. Observe that 
T 
ln=l an
T 
- a 
_a1 + • • • + aT - Ta 
T 
(a1-a) + • • • + (aT -a)
E I + 
(a
T +1
-a) + . . • + (aT-a) 
E 
T 
for 1 < T < T.- E By hypothesis , 3 TE > 0 3
J a - a J < E all n > T • n - E Let T > T • Then, E 
T 
(•T0+1 
-•) + • • •  + ('T -
•) 1 
< 
(T-T0) I (•1 -a) + · · · + ''T.-a ) T - T E ,  and T < 
quence {mit } C { mit } 3 mit (y2) ;2 
qi2 ' etc . , for n=t-1 , 3 qit-l n2 nl n2 
and a subsequence {m . } C { m .  l.t it 3 mj_t (yt-1) n + qit-1 .nt-1 nt-2 n t-1 t-1 
Now, consider the set of twice differentiable functions , Hit = 
2 {hi E C (]R. 1 E_ ) : h .  (0) l. 
q . v s < t-1 ; h . (y) l.S - l. 
O ;  h . (y ) = m .  (y ) V s < t-1 ;  h: (y ) l. S l.S S - l. S 
r . (y) } . Clearly , it suffices to show that,  l.t 
Claim : H n M .  'I I Lit it 
< ... 
T T 1
T a 
� (T�TE) T Suppose the claim is not true . Then 3 m . E M. 3 m: (y ) 'I q .  somei it l. S is E ! max 
n<T - E 
J a -a l < __£ E ·  n - T 
ln=l n - aHence ,  I T 
e: was arbitrary , the conclusion follows . / /  
E 
E + T E = E . Since 
s < t-1, or mi' (y) 'I r .  (y) , or equivalently, V h .  E Hi , either - it i t 
(Al) hi (ys) < -K2 or (A2) h'� (y ) > -K3 , some s < t-1 ,i s 
Lenuna 3 .  Yi 'I 0 since y 1 E Y .  all t > 1 . Since Y .  C Y . 1 all t ,  a or t t- it - it i 
bounded set , it remains only to show that Yit is closed V t .  Let { y } C tn 
Yit 3 y t + y . We must show that y e: Y .  , i . e . that 3 m . • Mi 3 m' . 1 cYn n it it t -it-
+ m: (y) = 1 .  it 
Define rit (y) c 1-m�it-l (y) . ri ( • ) is continuous V t ; 
is well-defined, and rit (y) lim r .  (y ) . Hence, rit (y)l.t t n n 
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rit (y)
lim mft (yt )n n n 
(Bl) h'.' (y) i < -K2 or (B2) h� (y) > -K3 •
�ut , if (Al) , then 3 J < ... 3 j > J =911 '.' - l.t (ys) < -K2 , and ifn .  J 
(A2) , then 3 J < '"' 3 j > J ;;>:n'.' (y ) > -K3 , which contradict the - it s 
fact that mit n 
e: M. , all n .it 
n . J 
Simila.r contradictions arise if (Bl) or 
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(B2) are assumed. It follows that Hit [\ Mit "f 0, and the lemma is
established. // 
Lemma 4 .  T o  prove (i) , i t  suffices t o  show that mit+l is such that
-
yit+l � yt-1 = yt ' since mft (yt-1) < mft-1 (yt-l) �;:>yit < Yt-1 ' and 
mit+l (yt-1) > mit (yt-1) l>iit+l > yt-1 " 
Suppose mit+l (yt-1) > mit (yt-1) . Then, yit < yt-1 = yt < yit+l "
Observe that xit = wi - yit + m-it-1 (yit) - Il i (yt-1)
, xit-1 = wi - yt-1
Since yit+l > yt-l > yit ' 3 A* c (0, 1) 3 yi (A*) yt-1 � 
x (A*) = xit-1" i u
i
(; .  ().*) , y . (A*) )l. l. 
contradiction of (10) and (11) . 
A similar development proves (ii) . // 
Lemma 5 .  Recall that V i � N ,  all t ,  
(12) 
(13)
- -mft (yit) + m:it-l (yit) = 1 • 
mit (yt) + m:it (yt) = 1 •
i u (xit-1 ' yt-1) , a
+ m-it-1 (yt-1) - Ili (yt-1) � xit ' and xit+l = wi - Yit+l + m-it (yit+l) - rri (yt-1) (14) mit-l (yt-1) + m:it-l (yt-1) 1 .
since ni (yt) = ni (yt-1) , where ni (yt-1) = Ili (m_it-1) is given by definition 6 .
Moreover, 
(10) f 1 - - 1 u (xit ' Yit) > u (xit-1 ' yt-1) ,
i - - i u (xit+l' Yit+l) > u (xit-1 ' yt-1) ,
by definition 7 .
i - - i - -Without loss of generality , assume that u (xit ' Yit) > u (xit+l ' Yit+l) . 
By the semi-strict quasi-concavity of ui (• ) --assumption l (ii) --we have ,
(11) 
where 
i - - i - -u (xi (A ) , yi (A ) )  � u (xit+l ' yit+l) all A c (0 , 1)
y i (},.) AYit + (1-A )  yit+l and xi (A)
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AXit + (1-A )  xit+l " 
(l2) and (l3) =5>  mit (yt) - mit (yit) = m:it-l (yit) 
- m:it (yt)
-
= m:it-l (yit) - m:it-l (yt-1 ) 
+ m:it-l (yt-1) - m:it (yt)
-t m:it-l (yit) - m:it-l (yt-1) 
since m:it-l (yt-l) - mit (yt) t 0 by lemmata 1, 4 .
By the Mean Value Theorem, 3 !;: .  and r;it 3 m:t {y ) - m:t (y . ) = l.t l. t l. l.t 
- -mft (!;:it) (yt - Yit) , and [m:it-l (yit) - m:it-l (yt-1) ] + [m:it-l (yt-1) -
m:it (yt ) ] = m�it-l (r;it) (yit - Yt-1) + o (l) .
If yi � y* = lim y , then we ' re done; if not , then 3 a subsequence t t t t 
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{yi } :3 y . + y + y*.  Now considert it 
(15) m'.' (F;. ) 
(yt - ;it) 
it it - = m" J y - y* J -it-1
(yit - Yt-1) + o (l) . (r;it) l"Y - Y* I 
> - < For t large , (y - y . ) < �>(y . - y 1) > 0 . Without loss of generality ,t it it t-
assume (yt - yit) > 0 for t large . 
t -1 . Hence , 3 T < "' :3 (15) � 
(y - y )
Then t it ' 
1-:Y - y* J 
(16) m�t (!;it) = m:it-l (r;it) + o (l) for t .::_ T .
.... 1 
(y . - y . )
t and 
it t-1 
l'Y - Y* I 
But , by definition of G*, m'.' (!; . ) e: [-x2 , -K3] and -m" " t 1 Cr; . t) e: it it -1 - 1 
[K3 , K2] , a contradiction of (16) for t large . // 
Lemma 6 .  There are two cases to consider : I .  3 a subsequence { yt} :3 yt 
,, yt h 
all n + h ,  and II.  3 T < "' :3 Y t y all t , s  > T .  s -
Case I .  * * * By lemma l (iv) , 3 ri < "' :3  m: (y )  + r . , and I .  N r .  it t 1 1< 1 
proves (i) . 
n n 
1 which 
[dms . -it 
But , 1 - lim m' . (y*) = lim m: (y*) and 1 - lim �d 
n
t -it t it n y <Yl '�·
- > -m: (y) �lim m': (y) - 0 some y e: [y , y*] , a contradiction since -K2 < m'\ (y)itn n itn - 1 n 
� -K3 < 0 all y . 
Case II.  (i) follows immediately from definition 5 (d) and S (b ) . 
To prove (ii) , suppose that m:t (y . t ) + r .  + r� = lim m: (yT) for some 1 n 1 n 1 1 t it 
- -subsequence { yi } C { yi } ,  and let y = lim y . • Clearly , yT = lim y • tn t n itn t t 
Without loss of generality , assume y < Yr·  By definition, ri = 1 -[ams . c; . )] -it it 
1 .  n n im d • n y [ s ]dm_it (yt) Observe that m'i 1 (y ) < �d�- < - t- t - y m:it (yt) .[ s -dm_it (yit )
lim m' .  (yt) . Hence ,  lim �d 
n n 
t -it n y + mit c;it )] n n 
[ dm:it (yt) ]
= l�
m � + mft (yt) . 
1 
lim f am:it (yt)] t l dy 
To prove (ii) suppose that y + y + y* = lim y for some subsequence But this is a contradiction: y < y and m� (y) < -K3 < 0 all y , t ' it n t • T it -n t 
{y . } :3 Yi + y . if n f h. Without loss of generality , assume y < y* .itn tn 1th 
Ms . C M . all t ��.im sup Ms . C M* . -it -it n -itn -1 lim M . •  t -it 1 -[dm:it (y*)] 
lim __ n 
n dy 1 - lim m:it (y*) since m:i (y*) = m:i(y
*) all m-i ' m_i e: t 
M* . by lemma 1 (iv) .-1 
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� lim mi_t (y) > lim mft (yT) ; thus , n n t 
[dm:it (y)] [ams .  (y )] 
lim __ n < lim ........=!!. T n dy t dy 
follows that mj5 t M .  for some j + i and some t large .t J t  
-45-
and it 
an . 
Finally, observe that if �a 1 (M . , m) _ m -it 
all t > T + l . / /  
-46-
0, all t ,  then mit' = mit-l • 
FOOTNOTES 
I would like to express my appreciation to Professor Jerome Gold stein and 
Pro fessor Rona ld Batchelder of the mathematics and economics departments , 
respectively , Tulane University , for their many helpful comments and 
criticisms of material presented in this paper . Errors that remain are , 
of course , my responsibility . 
1. For an elegant survey of the mechanisms that have been proposed , see
Groves ( 1979) • 
2 .  I f  consumers ' utilities are additive and linear in private goods , then 
truthtelling is a dominant strategy , and the dynamic question is moot ; 
otherwis e ,  however , truthtelling may not be a best strategy away from 
equilibrium. See Groves (1979 �  
3. See Greenberg ,  Mackay and Tideman (1977), Bamford (1979) and Ledyard
(1978).
4. Strategy equilibrium and correspond ing resource or real equilibria should
be distinguished in these models because there is not , in general , a 
one-to-one relationship between the two types of equilibria. Agents ' 
response rules are de fined on strategy sets d istinct from the allocation
space , and relate to the allocation space only indirectly through the
government admin istered mechanism. Thus , it is possible to have cyclical
behavior in strategies but an unchanging resource all ocation . 
5. The mechanism less the enforcem ent rule is exami ned elsewhere , and one 
conclusi on of these considerations is that the budget cannot be balanced
for this mechanism because of an overabundance of functions that satisfy 
the cho ice criteria. See Groves (1979). 
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6 .  
7 .  
B . 
9 .  
10. 
To our knowledge , no mechanism has been suggested that simultaneously 
elicits " truth" and ensures a balanced budget in equilibrium . The G-L 
quadratic mechanism does not necessarily elicit truthful information in 
equilibrium . 
If one defines ti = -zi , then t
i is interpreted as the tax paid by 
consumer i for the public good level y ,  and the public good balance 
equation becomes L i < N t
i = y .
Because a specific production relation has been assumed , and because 
there is a single private good , the production relation need not be 
represented explicitly in a specification of a state of the economy or of 
the economy itself. It is implicit , however , in W, the set of feasible 
states . 
Mechanisms in the literature and the Nash equilibrium concept used for 
these mechanisms are special cases of definitions 2 and 3 .  To see this , 
• 
just define E (M0 , m) = M0 , and observe that , for each i ,  mi is
at least as good as any other mi E M. ( in terms of the choice rule
i • 1 S ( . ) )  given the messages m .  of agents j 1' i .  :J 
This follows 
sup Mt = lim 
t 
from the fact that Mt+l c::: Mt
inf Mt (see Friedman (1970) . 
t 
for all t > 1 implies lim 
ll . ( 1) follows from maximizing a weighted sum of consumers ' utilities
subject to feasibility and production constraints , a standard method for 
generating Pareto optimal allocations . 
12. This difficulty is also circumvented by the government regardless of the
nature of agents ' response rules S ( • ) ,  if it alters the enforcement rule
to require that reported marginal valuations for each Yt be non­
increasing for all s > t .  See property (v )  of lemma 1 .  Since the entire
problem arises because it is possible to have a real stationary
allocation but periodicity in messages , other stopping rules that focus
on the real allocation can be used to prevent infinite cycling. However ,
e fficiency cannot then be guaranteed .
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13. See Greenberg ,  Mackay and Tideman ( 1977) .
14. There are specifications of the tax rules in which the balance te� for
any i is a function only of the previous messages of other agents j # i
that yield also an asymptotically balanced budget and no consumer
bankrup tcy when used in conjunction with the enforcement rule given
here . Such rules are easily constructed.
15. Consider the following example : Let X = C (I , I )  where I = [0 , 1] , and let
Xf = { x E I :  f (x)  = max f(y) } , a non-empty , closed set for each f E X.  
YEI 
Define xf = min Xf for each f E X ,  and fE (x) = 1/2 + E x ,  E 
< 1/2 .
Then , f + f = 1/2 as E + 0 whereas xf = 1 does not converge toE 0 E 
xf = O.  0 
16 . See Groves ( 197 9) for a discussion of a statement of the incentive
compatibility properties of static formulations of demand revelation
mechanisms similar to that developed dynamically in this paper .
17 . See Robinson-Suchanek ( 1979) for a generalized static statement and 
development of this relationship .
18 . Introduction of the correspondence n i ( • ) is necessary to deal with
response rules that are dependent only on other consumers' sets of 
permissable messages , thus being independent of their previous 
communication except as reflected by the enforcement rule in the 
restrictions on future communications . 
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